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Nowadays, DDoS attacks are often aimed at cloud computing 
environments, as more people use virtualization servers. With so 
many Nodes and distributed services, it will be challenging to rely 
solely on conventional networks to control and monitor intrusions. 
We design and deploy DDoS attack defense systems in virtualization 
environments based on Software-defined Networking (SDN) by 
combining signature-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
(NIDS) and sampled flow (sFlow). These techniques are practically 
tested and evaluated on the Proxmox production Virtualization 
Environment testbed, adding High Availability capabilities to the 
Controller. The evaluation results show that it promptly detects 
several types of DDoS attacks and mitigates their negative impact on 
network performance. Moreover, it also shows good results on Quality 
of Service (QoS) parameters such as average packet loss about 0 %, 
average latency about 0.8 ms, and average bitrate about 860 Mbit/s. 
 
Keywords: DDoS, High Availability, Cloud Computing, Virtualization, 
NIDS, SDN, Sflow, Openflow 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Virtualization is the key to cloud computing technology, where many 
industries widely use it today. Sharing a single physical computer between 
multiple isolated virtual machines leads to more optimized hardware use, 
allowing virtual device relocation and maintenance more effectively than its 
physical equivalent. Virtualization is used at different levels, such as networks, 
CPU, memory, storage, etc. It improves system availability and thus lowers 
costs, offering a superior scalable system [1]. Although virtualization offers 
many advantages, it brings new security challenges; the hypervisor's 
implementation introduces threats as hypervisors expose new attack vectors. 
One of the most significant security attacks that threaten service availability in 
the cloud or virtualization environment is Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
attack [2]. 
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In a cloud virtualization environment, DDoS attacks are aimed at virtual 
servers or instances, as multiple users may experience flooding even on the 
same cloud server. As workloads increase, cloud systems provide more 
computing power by engaging more virtual machines or service instances, and 
eventually, cloud services slow down, and legitimate customers lose access to 
their cloud services. DDoS can significantly reduce cloud services' 
performance by damaging instances or virtual servers in the cloud 
environment. DDoS attacks may be much more severe if attackers use more 
zombie machines to attack many systems. Some of the most complex DDoS 
attacks targeting Cloud Computing based on "2020 DDoS Attack Landscape" 
are UDP Flooding Attack, SYN Flooding Attack,  ACK Flood, HTTP Flood, SSDP 
Reflection Flood, NTP Reflection Flood, ICMP Flooding Attack, DNS Reflection 
Flood, and DNS Request Flood Attack [3]. Thus, a network-based security 
strategy is needed. Software-Defined Networks (SDN) become alluring in the 
fight against network-based attacks because SDN can easily collect network 
usage information, supporting improved algorithm designs to detect network-
based attacks. 
 
Figure 1. Proportions of Different DDoS Attack Types [3] 
  
SDN is a modern paradigm of architecture, deployment, and 
management of networks. This new generation of digital networks is built to 
make networks more scalable, agile, and dynamic to meet today's rapidly 
evolving business needs. Mobile device's rapid growth and emerging 
technologies such as the Internet of Things, Cloud Computing, and 
Virtualization Environment are some of the developments affecting SDN 
progress and at the field of modern networking has become a rising trend if as 
compared to conventional networks, this is due to its design flexibility. While 
the invention of SDN allows a network device dynamic, there are also some 
risks because it is generally susceptible to a single point of failure (SPOF), 
traffic diversion, side-channel attack, network manipulation, exploitation of 
Application Programming Interface (API), traffic sniffing, distributed denial of 
service attack and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. In short, the 
Volume 9, No. 2, December 2021 
 
EMITTER International Journal of Engineering Technology, p-ISSN: 2335-391X, e-ISSN: 2443-1168 
254 
attack depletes the network's capacity by overloading it with immense traffic 
at a time, rendering it inaccessible to legitimate users. 
 
2. RELATED WORKS  
The study of DDoS attacks is well studied, and many approaches have 
been researched over the past few years to prevent them, but most are 
conventional target networks. In parallel, SDNs are starting to emerge, gaining 
increasing attention from many network players. We are considering, among 
other things, offering an SDN-based strategy to thwart DDoS attacks 
immediately. There are already many solutions to combat DDoS attacks, but 
this research study focuses on SDN-based infrastructure security issues. Based 
on observed, can be categorized two different security strategies for 
evaluating such solutions: Signature-based and Anomaly-based detection. 
Signature-based techniques are used against known types of attacks in which 
incoming traffic patterns are compared with available attack signatures 
contained in the knowledge base. Manso et al. [4] presented SDN-based IDS to 
detect and mitigate DDoS attacks from botnets or their sources. Badotra et al. 
[5] offered SNORT-based for early DDoS detection using Opendaylight and 
open networking OS. Campos et al. [6] deployed On-the-Fly monitoring and 
treatment of security events using real SDN/OpenFlow Switch. Authors Po-
Wen Chi et al. [7] deployed AMI as a threat detection mechanism based on the 
SDN network using IDS integration. Yazdinejadna et al. [8] presented a 
kangaroo-based intrusion detection system (KIDS) on software-defined 
networks,  uses consecutive jumps like a kangaroo for announcing the attacks 
both to the SDN controller and other IDSs. 
Also, anomaly-based techniques have become popular in recent times, 
and they compare the incoming traffic pattern with the “normal” traffic pattern 
over a predefined period. There are several techniques offered here, including 
machine learning, statistical and artificial intelligence. For example, the 
authors of Lopez et al. [9] presented an intrusion detection and prevention 
system based on a Broflow traffic analyzer. The authors of Ombase et al. [10] 
presented Dos attack mitigation using rules-based and anomaly-based 
techniques using Bro IDS. And some authors using statistical anomaly-based 
detection techniques [11]–[14]. 
 
3. ORIGINALITY 
Many studies have contributed to detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks, 
with various techniques or strategies proposed. In previous research study 
[15], has been developed an SDN-based network intrusion detection system to 
detect and mitigate DDoS attacks at the application layer, which have 
successfully implemented on virtualization servers against HTTP DoS attacks. 
Next, the research study were continued to detect and combat DDoS attacks 
running in the Proxmox-VE virtualization cluster environment. This research 
study goal is to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks while maintaining Quality of 
Service (QoS) legitimate users even when online services are under attack. 
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Additionally, the solutions are scalable and still open enough to improvise to 
accommodate the detection and mitigation of other types of DDoS attacks.  
Applying a direct network traffic pattern analysis mechanism to the SDN 
controller will overload the centralized control area and force the SDN 
controller to downgrade its performance for these other tasks [16]. It is, 
likewise, introducing NIDS into an SDN network that requires implementing 
Port mirroring or Network TAP results in significant resource consumption, 
especially in high-traffic network environments. In contrast to previous 
studies presented in table 1, which uses Network Tap as packet-oriented 
monitoring of SDN-based intrusion detection systems as a mechanism for 
early detection and prevention of DDoS attacks [3-5], [8]. TAP mode scenarios 
require dedicated physical NIC devices, neither efficient nor flexible, to deploy 
in multi-node virtualization environments. With sFlow as a more flexible and 
lightweight agent for monitoring network traffic, which has tested and 
evaluated in a testbed of the production virtualization environment of 
Proxmox-VE. Centralized use of NIDS using the sflow agent on the SDN 
platform as an effective and practical strategy applied to virtualization 
environments to detect and combat DDoS attacks without adding more 
compute load to server nodes and avoiding network or communication 
overheads that are less affected by monitoring activities.  
Table 1. Comparison with existing research 
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As a contribution to this research study is a hybrid system that combines NIDS 
and sFlow, which is applied to a virtualization environment with multisite 
Nodes or clusters that support high availability systems. With the SDN-based 
hybrid NIDS and sFlow system, have succeeded in implementing the DDoS 
defense system without burdening or reducing performance on the Controller 
because the network traffic pattern analysis mechanism is not carried out by 
the Controller but assigned to the NIDS. In addition, by eliminating Network-
TAP with sFlow, this system is more efficient in terms of network resource 
consumption, more flexible, and scalable to implement. 
 
4. SYSTEM DESIGN 
This section discusses the design and implementation of SDN-based 
network intrusion detection as a system capable of detecting and combating 
DDoS attacks in a virtualized environment. The solution also maintains Quality 
of Service (QoS) levels and prevents Single Point of Failure (SPOF) on 
controllers caused by a failure on the hardware side or network problems. The 
experimental infrastructure used to conduct this research is the Proxmox 
Production Virtualization Environment. This Proxmox Cluster Virtualization 
Environment consists of three Proxmox VE v6.3-3 nodes running on a physical 
computer with the following technical specifications: 
• CPU Specification, 24 x Intel(R)Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620v2 @2.10Ghz 
• RAM 64 GiB and SSD 512GiB. 
Each node is also equipped with two network interfaces, where one NIC 
is for internet connectivity, and the other NIC is used for internal connectivity 
in a virtualized environment; the specifications run on each VM can also be 
seen in table 2. Each node also activates the Openflow Switch or OpenvSwitch 
mode connected to the SDN controller. In this study, Ryu is used as the 
Controller, which runs in a Container on one of the nodes. This SDN controller 
is also supported with High Availability and automatic Failover by utilizing the 
HA feature on the Proxmox-VE Clusters and Keepalived. 





Controller (C1, C2) Ryu Controller, 
Keepalived 
LXC; Ubuntu 20.04-64bit, 1GiB RAM, 
2Core,8G Ceph Storage 
NIDS Snort, Sflow-RT, 
Pigrelay 
VM; Ubuntu 20.04-64bit, 4GiB RAM, 4Core, 
32G Ceph Storage 
Target’s Server Apache2, Iperf VM; Ubuntu 20.04-64bit, 4GiB RAM, 4Core, 
32G Ceph Storage 
Attacker's Host 
(H1, H2, H3) 
Hping3, T50 VM; Ubuntu 20.04-64bit, 4GiB RAM, 4Core, 
32G Ceph Storage 
Legitimate’s Host Iperf, ping VM; Ubuntu 20.04-64bit, 4GiB RAM, 
4Core, 32G Ceph Storage 
 
Figure 2 is a visual representation of the virtualization environment have 
built, and it can be shown that OpenvSwitch running on each node has 
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activated sFlow-agent to monitor network devices. Packet flow sampling and 
counter sampling are performed by sFlow instances associated with individual 
Data Sources within the sFlow Agent. The sFlow agent collects counters and 
packet flow records and sends them in the form of a sflow datagram to sFlow-
Collector. 
 
Figure 2. Experiment Infrastructure 
 
VM NIDS contains three modules, namely: sFlow-Collector, Snort-NIDS, 
and pigrelay. The sFow-Collector acts as a collector of all sent sFlow data from 
all sFlow-agents; It also converts the sFlow datagram into packet capture 
(PCAP). In this work, the sampling rate used is 1: 100 and the polling used is 1 
second. The 1: 100 sampling rate means that one packet sample is taken from 
every 100 packets captured by the sFlow-agent, with 1-second intervals on the 
sampling counters, and only the header information of the corresponding 
sample is sent to the collector. 
Snort NIDS acts as an attack detection and alarm mechanism and 
operates according to the rules have created to trigger the alarm in a DDoS 
attack. Snort NIDS is not run inline on the network interface to analyze traffic 
on the captured network but instead runs in packet reading mode. This 
process runs parallel with converting process sFow data to PCAP, as shown in 
the system workflow for every received packet in Figure 4. Pigrelay Module 
acts as a relay that listens for alert messages from snort via the Network Socket 
and sends alert messages to the Controller. Apart from implementing the High 
Availability feature in the Proxmox virtualization environment, these two 
controllers also running in dual master-slave mode with Keepalived, with one 
Controller acting as master and the other as hot standby controller. It is 
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applied to controllers to achieve Failover and high availability controllers, 
avoid single points of failure, and ensure continuous operation without any 
downtime. When Snort NIDS detects a DDoS, an alert message will be sent to 
the Ryu-Controller on MASTER state, because by default, the MASTER node 
will be the active node.  As shown in Figure 3, the Controller on MASTER state 
will periodically send a broadcast packet in the form of an Announcement 
message as information on its availability, allowing all OpenFlow's messages 
for Switch and Controller communication or vice versa, acknowledged and 
replied to by the Controller in MASTER state. If the Controller on BACKUP state 
does not receive the Announcement message more than three times, it 
indicates that the MASTER Controller is down and initiates a failover process 
to take over the role of MASTER by sending random ARP packets to the 
network.  All hosts receiving the gratuitous ARP update their tables, which 




Figure 3.  High Availability Ryu Controller using Keepalived 
 
The failback process also works the same way; BACKUP waits for two 
announcements from the MASTER before giving the virtual IP back and stops 
sending announcements. All OVS connected to the Controller are configured 
using the controller's virtual IP, where the setting in the keepalived.conf file. 
Figure 4 is the system workflow for each packet received to 
OpenvSwitch. All incoming packets will be carried out in two parallel 
processes, namely the process of parsing the packet header and then matching 
it with the flow table and the process of sampling packets into sFlow 
datagrams. If no match occurs on the flow table, then OpenvSwitch will ask the 
Controller for a new rule for the new flow. Then, the controller working with 
the reactive mechanism will respond by sending a new forwarding rule for the 
new stream. If no match is found in the flow table, this means that 
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OpenvSwitch already has a flow rule for the received packet. Meanwhile, in 
another process, the sFlow datagram received by the Collector will be 
converted back into packet capture data for analysis by Snort NIDS. By its 
turns, NIDS will only send an alert message to Mitigator if the packet is 
detected as a DDoS attack packet and send the blocking flow rule to 
OpenvSwitch. 
Figure 4.  System Workflow  
 
5. EXPERIMENT AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, will describe evaluation test and discuss the results 
obtained. To simulate a DDoS attack, stress test tools used is Hping3 and 
packet injectors T50 to send TCP / IP packets tailored to the DDoS attack. The 
types of DDoS attacks that simulate are the top 2 types of DDoS attacks based 
on the Proportion of DDoS Attack Types in 2019 [1].  
 
5.1 Network Scenarios  
The test scenario is divided into three scenarios, wherein in these 
scenarios, several parameters will be observed; Average Latency, Receive 
Bitrate, Packet Loss and Mitigation Time. 
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Table 3. Tests Scenario Summary 
Test Scenario Type  Attack Target Parameters Monitored 
Normal None Target Server on Node 
1, Node 2, and Node 3 
Latency, Bitrate (RX), 
Packet Loss 
Attack Scenario I 
 
UDP Flood Target Server on Node 
2 
Bitrate (RX), Latency, 
Packet Loss, Mitigation 
Time 
Attack Scenario II TCP (SYN) Flood Target Server on Node 
3 
Bitrate (RX), Latency, 
Packet Loss, Mitigation 
Time 




Latency, Bitrate (RX), 
Packet Loss 
 
Figure 5(a) and 5(b) shows a test attack scenario I attack scenario II on 
the testing infrastructure, where three hosts are prepared as the attacker's 
host and three hosts as target servers running on a virtual machine at each 
node.  
 
(a)                                                                          (b) 
Figure 5. DDoS Attack scenario on virtualization environment 
 
In implementing the DDoS attack mitigation system, using mitigator 
module, as shown in algorithm 1. The Controller will read the alert message 
sent from Snort NIDS, then perform parsing and data extraction of the message 
packet and send the drop flow to the OpenFlow switch. 
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Algorithm 1.  Mitigator module 
 
5.2 Test Result 
As previously explained, in this scenario, the system is monitored 
normally on all virtualized environment nodes. Figure 6 is a graphical 
representation of the trend of network traffic on one of the OVS. 
 
 
Figure 6. Normal traffic on each Node before DDoS Attack  
 
Table 4 shows some value of Quality of Service (QoS) parameters, from 
hosts 1, 2, and 3 (attacker’s hosts) and 4th host (legitimate host) to each target 
server located at each node. Normally all hosts have an average latency value 
of <1ms and an average bandwidth of >800 Mbit/s. 
Table 4. System Performance on each Node  
Host 
No 



















(ms) (Mbps) (%) (ms) (Mbps) (%) (ms) (Mbps) (%) 
1 0,864 884 0 0,821 886 0 0,868 885 0 
2 0,826 871 0 0,923 915 0 0,874 891 0 
3 0,858 882 0 0,916 909 0 0,901 903 0 
4 0,914 909 0 0,934 881 0 0,896 898 0 
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To find out the impact of a DDoS attack, we also capture and plot the 
result (Figure 7) of DDoS attack traffic volume when DDoS Defense system is 
disabled so that network traffic can be shown spikes up to 250,000 packets/s. 
At the same time, it can also be seen in the image visualization that the CPU 
utility has increased drastically by 25% on one of the nodes that were getting 
a DDoS attack. This shows that a DDoS attack in the virtualization environment 
will impact consuming bandwidth and available resources. 
 
 
Figure 7. Target’s server under attack - without DDoS Defense 
 
5.2.1 Attack Scenario I 
The attack scenario to be executed in this section is the UDP Flood 
attack, where this attack is carried out by carrying out a DDoS attack 
originating up to 3 attacker's hosts, as shown in Figure 5(a). The stress test 
tool used in this scenario is hping3 which is executed on the command “hping3 
-flood -UDP -k -s 53” by flooding the UDP port 53 packets to the target server 
(172.16.200.200), which is migrated to Node-2. From Figure 8, it can be 
observed that the traffic was normal up to 80 seconds, then three attacking 
hosts started launching UDP flood attacks which were detected since the 
number of packets peaked drastically up to 50,000 packets/s. DDoS attacks in 
the form of UDP floods can be mitigated to the 85th seconds, and the network 
returns to its normal state afterward. 
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Figure 8. Mitigation Time - UDP flood (3 attackers) 
Table 5 shows the average latency and packet loss results from host-4 
(legitimate host) to the server that targets a UDP flood attack. It can be shown 
that the mitigation time increases as the number of attack sources increases. 
Table 5. Performance Result – UDP flood mitigation 
No. of Host 
(Attacker) 















(ms) (%) Mbit/s (ms) (%) Mbit/s (s) 
1 0,88 2,2 89 0,732 0 876 2 
2 0,90 2,7 56 0,76 0 881 3 
3 0,93 3,3 32,5 0,771 0 874 4 
 
5.2.2 Attack Scenario II 
The second attack scenario is the TCP SYN attack, launched by 1 to 3 
attackers' hosts, as shown in Figure 5(b). The packet injector used in this 
scenario is T50 which is executed with the command "t50 --flood --turbo --
dport 80 -S --protocol TCP" send TCP SYN request connection faster to port 80 
on the target server migrating to Node-3. 
 
Figure 9. Mitigation Time – TCP SYN flood (1 attacker) 
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From Figure 9, it can be observed that a DDoS attack with one attacking 
host was detected at 43 seconds, the overflow of TCP SYN packets increased 
up to 80,000 packets/s, and the network returned to normal at 46 seconds. 
Table 6 shows the DDoS Defense system's performance, can be observe that 
the average latency and mitigation time of the TCP SYN flood attack increases 
based on the number of attack sources and does not find any packet loss 
values. 
Table 6. Performance Result – TCP (SYN) flood mitigation 
No. of Host 
(Attacker) 















(ms) (%) Mbit/s (ms) (%) Mbit/s (s) 
1 1,4 19 4,4 0,819 0 858 3 
2 1,99 20,6 2,0 0,883 0 862 3 
3 2,37 23,3 0,3 1,075 0 856 4 
 
5.2.3 HA Controller Test 
 In this scenario, High Availability test on the Controller by measuring 
when a Failover and Failback process occurs between Controller-1 and 
Controller-2. As shown in Figure 10, Controller-1 is the Primary Controller, 
and the setting has a higher priority than Controller-2 as the Secondary 
Controller. Based on the observation, the transition process of MASTER and 
BACKUP conditions during Failover takes up to 2 seconds, and Failback is 2 
seconds. 
 
 Figure 10. Failover and Failback Controller 
Based on the results of Quality of Service (QoS) measurements during 
the Failover and Failback processes, table 7 shows that no Packet Loss was 
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1 0,739 0,00 885 0,681 0,00 884 
2 0,678 0,00 891 0,738 0,00 903 
3 0,704 0,00 903 0,638 0,00 882 
Average 0,707 0,00 893 0,686 0,00 890 
 
The comparison results with previous studies can be seen in table 8. In 
the UDP Flood scenario, the average mitigation time is 3.0 seconds; This result 
is very close to the same test conducted by Manso et al. [3], the average 
mitigation time obtained is 3.07 seconds. While in the second scenario with 
the TCP SYN Flood attack, the average mitigation time is 3.3 seconds. This 
shows a better mitigation time than the results obtained by Sumantra et al. 
[13], which is 10.2 seconds. 




Existing Research  
(Manso et al. [4]) 
Existing Research 







(s) (s) (s) 
UDP Flood 3,0 3,07 N/A 
SYN Attack 3,3 N/A 10,2 
And besides that, it also shows that by using sampled flow (sFlow), the 
mitigation time achieved is almost the same as IDS integration using Network 
TAP; even the mitigation time is even faster when compared to the Anomaly-
based technique using a statistical approach.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an SDN-based DDoS attack defense system in a 
virtualization environment and evaluates it in a production testbed of the 
Proxmox-VE. In this research study, the approach used considers the flexibility 
and scalability of the virtualization environment by adopting sampling 
techniques integrated with network intrusion detection systems (NIDS). The 
results show that DDoS defense system can effectively detect and mitigate UDP 
flood and TCP SYN Flood attacks in a Virtualization Environment. Besides, by 
implementing sFlow, which is integrated with Snort-IDS, this architecture can 
also be extended and improved to identify other DDoS attacks. In future work 
will cover to use sFlow for hybrid technique that combines signature-based 
and anomaly-based techniques using machine learning to improve DDoS 
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